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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950548-CA 
(consolidated) 
v. : 
MARK BELLISTON, : Priority No. 2 
Oral Argument Not Requested 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Mark Belliston appeals convictions for two counts of 
distribution of a controlled substance, third degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1995), distribution within 1000 feet of a church, a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), -(5)(a)(ix) (1995), and engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3) 
(1995). The convictions were entered upon jury verdicts in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Beaver County, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, presiding. This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly allow testimony about Belliston's other, 
uncharged bad acts? The admission of "other acts" evidence under rules 404(b) and 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed in two steps. First, it is determined whether 
the evidence is relevant to show something other than "bad character;" this is a 
determination of law, reviewed nondeferentially. If relevant, the trial court's balancing 
of relevance versus unfair prejudice is reviewed with some deference, and reversed 
only if "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 698 (Utah 
App. 1993). See also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court and jury properly reject Belliston's "entrapment" 
defense? This Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury *s 
verdict of guilt, State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989), State v. 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah App. 1993), and will "affirm the defendant's 
conviction unless the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was 
entrapped." Id. at 706 (citing State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986)). 
3. Was Belliston properly convicted both of the predicate criminal 
offenses and of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity? This is a question of 
statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews for correctness, affording no 
deference to the trial court. State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1994). 
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4. Is Belliston entitled to a reduction of his offense level regarding the 
"distribution within 1000 feet of a church" verdict? Deferential appellate review 
applies: "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused 
its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 
1993). See also State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
5. Did the trial court erroneously sentence Belliston more severely than 
recommended in his presentence report? As with the immediately preceding issue, this 
is an "abuse of discretion" question. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal involves the following statutes, which are reproduced in the 
appendix to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601 through -1603(3) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of criminal charges against defendant Mark 
Belliston and his sister, Stacy Lynn Belliston. In Case No. 94-CR-73, Mark was 
charged with distribution of a controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony 
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(R. 73:2).l In Nos. 94-CR-74 and 94-CR-75, he was charged with distribution within 
1000 feet of a church, a second degree felony (R. 74:2, 75:2). In No. 94-CR-100, he 
was charged with engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony (R. 
100:1-2). Stacy Belliston was similarly charged (R. 76, 77, 99). 
The charges were consolidated, and a joint trial was set (R. 73:21). The 
Bellistons gave notice of their "entrapment" defense (R. 100:23-24). Entrapment was 
argued as part of a defense motion to dismiss after the State completed its case in chief 
(Tr. 432-33). The court denied the motion and let the issue go to the jury (Tr. 437). 
The jury found Mark Belliston guilty as charged, except for Case No. 74, 
in which the jury did not find the "church proximity* element proven, and found him 
guilty only of simple distribution (R. 99:104-06). After a presentence evaluation, the 
trial court sentenced Belliston to two terms of one to fifteen years and two terms of 
zero to five years on the second and third degree felonies, respectively, said sentences 
to run concurrently, and fined him (R. 73:30-31). However, the court suspended those 
sanctions and placed Belliston on probation, under terms including four months in jail, 
drug rehabilitation, supervision and restrictions common to probation, reduced fines, 
and a surcharge (R. 73:23-25). Stacy Belliston was convicted of similar charges, and 
^ach district court file is separately paginated. Citation to the district court records will 
be by trial court case and page number; thus, "R. 75:2-4" indicates pages 2-4 of the record in 
district court case no. 94-CR-75. aTr." refers to the three trial transcripts dated 15-17 
February 1995. The volumes are paginated consecutively. 
4 
was similarly sentenced (R. 99:130-33). Both Bellistons now appeal. By this Court's 
order of 20 March 1996, this appeal (formerly No. 950557-CA) is consolidated with 
State v. Stacy Lynn Belliston, No. 950548-CA, which was separately briefed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as otherwise noted, the facts are stated "in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). The events in 
question occurred in or near the town of Beaver, Utah. 
1. First Hook Transaction (Distribution within 1000 Feet of a Church) 
(Case No. 75) 
On 04 August 1994, Stacy Belliston visited Raymond Erickson, and asked 
him if he wanted to buy some marijuana (Tr. 71-72). Stacy was one hundred dollars 
short of the money she needed for a drug run (Tr. 78, 168). To help Stacy raise 
money, Erickson offered to introduce her to some people who had previously asked 
him for marijuana (Tr. 76). The people were Daniel and Vicki Hook (Tr. 76). 
Unbeknownst to Erickson, who was acting "entirely on [his] own without 
any . . . encouragement from any law enforcement" (Tr. 81), the Hooks were 
confidential informants (Tr. 124). On occasion, Daniel Hook had asked Erickson if he 
knew where to get some marijuana (Tr. 92, 95-96). Erickson also testified that on one 
previous occasion, he and Daniel Hook had smoked marijuana together (Tr. 83-86). 
However, Hook in fact only simulated smoking (Tr. 277-78). 
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Stacy accepted Erickson's suggestion, and the two drove in her truck to 
the Hooks' trailer (Tr. 76). When they arrived, Erickson told Daniel Hook that he 
"had found somebody who would be willing to sell some—some marijuana to him if he 
wanted to front her a hundred dollars" (Tr. 78). In fact, Erickson introduced Stacy as 
"the person who supplies marijuana for the town" (Tr. 230). 
Stacy got out of the truck and described to Daniel Hook "how much that 
she would give him for [a] hundred dollars" (Tr. 78). She offered an extra quarter-
ounce to the Hooks because they were fronting the $100 (Tr. 257). Daniel Hook was 
leery about fronting the money (Tr. 257). But based his experience buying from the 
Bellistons, Erickson assured Hook that he "wouldn't have no problem with getting 
what—what he was paying for" (Tr. 78, see also 171, 272). 
Vicki Hook went into the trailer and telephoned the supervising police 
investigator, Officer Goodwin. She explained what was happening, and obtained 
Goodwin's permission to do the deal (Tr. 169). Daniel Hook gave Stacy Belliston $100 
in marked bills, and she agreed to deliver the drugs the next day (Tr. 80). 
The next day, Stacy and Mark Belliston returned to the Hooks' trailer 
(Tr. 171-72). Stacy walked over to Daniel Hook, "threw the three quarter baggies of 
marijuana on the National Geographic that he was reading and said, 'Well, there you 
go'" (Tr. 172, 307, 310, see also 257). Hook told the Bellistons that "if they got any 
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in the future, . . . we would appreciate them coming back to us, and they did" (Tr. 
176, see also 257-58). 
2. Second Hook Transaction (Distribution) 
(Case No. 73) 
About two weeks later, Vicki Hook was talking to a friend in town when 
Stacy Belliston "pulled in and said, 'Hi'"; Vicki walked over to her (Tr. 178). Vicki 
told Stacy "something . . . along the lines of 'By the way, we're out. If you can do 
anything else at some time, we'd appreciate it'" (Tr. 178). Stacy said she would have 
to talk to her brother (Tr. 177-78). About two days later, Mark Belliston told the 
Hooks, "I'll let you know when we're going to make the next run" (Tr. 258-59). 
On 22 August 1994, Stacy Belliston appeared at the Hooks' trailer (Tr. 
176, 178). Stacy told Vicki "that she and her brother were getting ready to make 
another drug—marijuana run, and that if we were interested, that they would need to 
get some money from us before they left, to help on their finances in going and making 
a drug run" (Tr. 176, 178). Daniel Hook replied that "all we had was $200" (Tr. 
259). Stacy responded that "they would give [him] six quarters, because they gave 
[him] three for the hundred" (Tr. 259). The Hooks gave Stacy $200 (Tr. 180-81); 
Stacy told the Hooks that "they'd be back the next day" (Tr. 259). 
When the Bellistons did not deliver the marijuana by 24 August, Vicki 
Hook called Troy Bradshaw, an acquaintance at Mark Belliston's work, in order to get 
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the Bellistons' home telephone number. Troy told them how to find the number and 
added "that he was also waiting for Stacy and Mark to come and deliver drugs to him" 
(Tr. 183). When Vicki Hook called Stacy Belliston, Stacy said that she and Mark 
"would be making the trip into town to distribute drugs to different people, and that we 
[the Hooks] would see them between 9:00 and 10:00 P.M." (Tr. 185). 
After another change in delivery plans (Tr. 185), the Hooks fortuitously 
met Mark Belliston on the side of a rural road (Tr. 186-87). Mark stated "that he was 
really sorry that it took them so long to get back with the drugs" and that "good drug 
customers" shouldn't be kept waiting (Tr. 187). He added "that from now on, when 
[they] bought drugs from him, that [they] wouldn't have to wait, because he would 
have them on hand" (Tr. 188, 261). He then gave them an ounce and a half of 
marijuana (Tr. 180, 188, 261). 
3. Third Hook Transaction (Distribution) 
(Case No. 74) 
On 02 September 1994, Mark Belliston "showed up on his own" at the 
Hooks' trailer (Tr. 189). He stated "that he had some smoke [marijuana] that he 
wondered if [they] were interested in" (Tr. 190). They were (Tr. 192). The price was 
$100 for two quarter-ounce baggies (Tr. 192). Vicki Hook only had $99, but Mark 
gave her the marijuana (Tr. 193, 307, 310). 
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Vicki Hook wore a "wire" for all three of these transactions and also 
wrote contemporaneous notes, which she turned over to the police (Tr. 162-63, 174, 
186, 192, 194-96, 380; R. 99:36-42). At trial, Stacy Belliston admitted selling 
marijuana to the Hooks, but claimed she "did it for Raymond [Erickson]" and because 
the Hooks "kept bugging me and bugging me and bugging me" (Tr. 464, 470, 478). 
Mark claimed that he knew of Stacy's marijuana dealing, but tried to persuade her to 
stop, and delivered marijuana for Stacy to keep her out of trouble: "And I, as her big 
brother, took it upon myself to make sure she was not any longer involved with it, and 
I took the drugs to the people" (Tr. 510). Given that clumsy testimony, his generally 
implausible explanation of how he supported himself without a regular job, and his 
contradictory account of his knowledge about marijuana, (see Tr. 492-99, 505-20), it is 
not surprising that the jury disbelieved the entrapment defense. 
The Hooks' trailer, where the sale in Case No. 75 was completed, was 
located within 1000 feet of an L.D.S. church (Tr. 141-42). The Hooks' supervisor, 
Officer Goodwin, had only told them to locate the trailer in a park with telephone 
service (Tr. 125). The Hooks chose Beaver Canyon Campground (Tr. 125-26). 
Goodwin did not know until after the Hooks had moved away that their trailer was 
within 1000 feet of a church; nor did he realize the significance of that fact (Tr. 135). 
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4. Other Transactions Supporting Pattern of Unlawful Activity Charge 
(No. 100) 
The above-recited marijuana sales supported the charge of engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activity. At least three other sales, not separately charged, also 
supported the "pattern" charge. Around 24 July 1994, Raymond Erickson purchased a 
quarter ounce of marijuana from Stacy and Mark Belliston (Tr. 372). On 04 or 05 
August 1994, Troy Bradshaw purchased three quarters of an ounce of marijuana from 
the Bellistons (Tr. 350-53). Later that month, Bradshaw purchased another quarter 
ounce of marijuana from the Bellistons (Tr. 353-55). 
After amassing the foregoing evidence, police arrested the Bellistons. 
Mark Belliston waived his silence and counsel rights, and confessed his involvement in 
marijuana sales (Tr. 401-02, 407). The jury found both Bellistons guilty of the various 
above-described charges. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Evidence of uncharged other criminal acts was properly admitted. 
Because the evidence was relevant to prove elements of the "pattern of unlawful 
activity" charge, it was presumptively admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Nor 
was the evidence so unfairly prejudicial, in light of evidence supporting the charged 
crimes, that the trial court acted unreasonability in admitting it under Utah R. Evid. 
403. Alternatively, any error in the admission of uncharged crimes evidence was 
10 
harmless. Belliston's appellate claims that the "pattern" charge should have been 
separately tried, and that a cautionary instruction should have been given about the 
"other acts" evidence, are waived due to failure to so argue in the trial court. 
2. Belliston's entrapment claim fails because the police investigation in 
this case did not include any improper pressure upon the Bellistons to commit criminal 
acts. Instead, the police activity fell well within the range that has been upheld by 
Utah's appellate courts. Further, the record demonstrates that both Bellistons were 
willing participants in the charged crimes. Mark Belliston's "enhancement entrapment" 
argument, based upon the proximity of the Hooks' residence to a church, lacks citation 
to authority; it has been rejected by courts that have considered it in other cases. 
3. Belliston's claim that the "pattern of unlawful activity" conviction is 
improperly duplicative of his convictions for the predicate crimes also fails. The 
"pattern" statute's text reveals a clear legislative intent to permit cumulative 
punishment for both the "pattern" offense and the predicate crimes. This conclusion is 
consistent with federal court interpretations of analogous federal statutes. 
4. Belliston's argument that the "church proximity" element of Case No. 
75 should have been deleted, reducing the offense to a third degree felony, fails 
because Belliston concedes that the "proximity" element was proven at trial. He cannot 
otherwise prove that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the offense level 
11 
reduction, because the trial court meted out a suspended sentence that was far less strict 
than governing law allows. 
5. Belliston's argument that the trial court failed to follow the 
presentence recommendation is frivolous. He was placed on probation, even though he 
could have been sent to prison for up to forty years on the guilty verdicts. To whatever 
degree the trial court departed from the presentence recommendation, it unquestionably 
had discretion to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY OR HARMLESSLY 
ADMITTED AT BELLISTON'S TRIAL; BELLISTON'S SEVERANCE 
AND INSTRUCTIONAL CHALLENGES ARE WAIVED 
In his first point on appeal, Mark Belliston raises an issue not raised by 
Stacy Belliston. He argues that State's witness Troy Bradshaw was improperly allowed^ 
to testify about his two marijuana purchases from the Bellistons in August 1994 (Tr. 
350-55) (Br. of Appellant at 8-10). Presumably he also challenges evidence of the sale 
to Raymond Erickson (Tr. 374-75). Those transactions were not formally charged 
against the Bellistons; rather, they were used to help support the charge of engaging in 
a pattern of unlawful activity (see R. 100:1-2; Tr. 349-50). Mark Belliston challenges 
the evidence of those transactions under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
He also contends that even if the evidence was properly admitted, the trial court should 
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have severed the "pattern of unlawful activity" charge supported by that evidence, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4) (1995), or else should have given a cautionary instruction 
about the "other acts" evidence (Br. of Appellant at 8, 10). 
A. Admissibility under Rules 404(b) and 403. 
Belliston argues that evidence of his uncharged "other acts" should have 
been presumed prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible (Br. of Appellant at 8). 
However, rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule" that renders "other acts" evidence 
presumptively admissible: "Prior [other] bad act evidence is only excluded where the 
sole reason it is being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted 
in conformity with that character." State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 
1993) (emphasis in original).2 See also State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 
1983). Additionally, Utah's "pattern of unlawful activity" statutes specifically provide 
that the predicate acts constituting this offense need not be charged as discrete crimes. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602(4), 76-10-1603(3) (1995); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 
631, 635 (Utah 1988). Therefore, under the "pattern" statutes, "other acts" serve as 
offense elements, and need not be charged as separate offenses. 
In this case, evidence of Belliston's uncharged marijuana sales was 
presumptively admissible under rule 404(b), and under the "pattern" statutes, because it 
2The text of rule 404(b) permits "other acts" evidence for "proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident." 
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was not offered solely to prove Belliston's bad character or actions in conformity 
therewith. Instead, the evidence was offered to prove conduct that is a critical element 
of the "pattern of unlawful activity" charge, specifically "any act prohibited by the 
criminal provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4)(qqq) (1995). Therefore, as a matter of law, O'Neil, 848 
P.2d at 698, the evidence of Belliston's "other acts" satisfied rule 404(b). 
Once past the rule 404(b) threshold, "other acts" evidence must also 
satisfy rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, under which relevant evidence may be 
excluded when "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The 
"prejudice" to justify exclusion must be extreme: exclusion is appropriate only if the 
evidence will cause the jury to feel "overmastering hostility" toward the opposing 
party. O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (quoting authority). On appeal, a trial court's rule 403 
decision will not be disturbed unless it is "beyond the limits of reasonability." Id. at 
698 (quoting authority). 
In this case, the admission of evidence of Belliston's uncharged "other 
acts" was not beyond the limits of reasonability. Because those uncharged acts were 
alleged as elements of the "pattern of unlawful activity charge," they were powerfully 
relevant. Further, Belliston already stood formally charged with several other 
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marijuana sales. The ample evidence supporting those charges would have already 
induced the jury to adopt a dim view of Belliston's character. Any negative feelings 
added by evidence of the uncharged marjuana sales could only have negligible 
additional impact: the major damage was already done. 
The cases cited by Belliston do not compel a different result. Only State 
v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1990) (Br. of Appellant at 9), is even a rule 404(b) and 
rule 403 case. In Cox, this Court held that in a rape case, evidence of other, uncharged 
sexual assaults was improperly admitted because it did not fit rule 404(b)'s "common 
design" or "identity" usages, and because the other acts were too remote in time from 
the charged rape. 787 P.2d at 6-7. Cox is distinguishable from this case because in 
that case no "pattern of unlawful activity" charge was made, under which other acts are 
offense elements. Additionally, Belliston's "other acts" were not temporally remote; 
they occurred within a few months of the charged crimes. Finally, evidence of violent 
sex crimes is qualitatively more inflammatory than evidence of drug sales. 
State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978) (Br. of Appellant at 9), is 
off-point, because it is a rule 608-609 (formerly rule 47) "impeachment by character 
evidence" case, not a rule 404(b) (formerly rule 55) "other acts" case. In fact, in 
barring proof of character or untrustworthiness based upon "bare, unproven 
allegations" of other conduct, 578 P.2d at 1290 (emphasis in original), the Court in 
Goodliffe specifically observed: "The rule, of course, is different where the evidence 
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of other crimes or civil wrongs is relevant to prove some other material fact such as 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." Id. So too are 
State v. Minnish, 560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977), and State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
1978) (Br. of Appellant at 9) unhelpful to Belliston. Those cases also dealt with 
"character" evidence under Utah's former rules of evidence; they do not involve "other 
acts" used to prove a material element of a criminal offense. 
B. Harmless Error. 
Even if evidence of Belliston's uncharged "other acts" was improperly 
admitted, such error would require reversal only if, had the evidence been excluded, 
there is a "reasonable likelihood" of a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a) ("harmless error" rules). For errors that are not constitutional in nature, 
the appellant bears the burden of proving harmfulness. Verde, 770 P.2d at 121 n. 10. 
In this case, Belliston does not argue that the evidence of bis other acts 
meets the "reasonable likelihood" test for harmful, reversal-justifying error. That 
omission alone dooms this point on appeal. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (lack of analysis or authority defeats appellate claim for relief); State v. 
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same). Nor can a plausible argument be 
constructed. The jury found Belliston guilty of three specifically charged instances of 
distributing illegal drugs, in Case Nos. 73, 74, and 75. Those verdicts, by themselves, 
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satisfied the "three episodes" requirement of the "pattern of unlawful activity" charge, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) (1995). Whatever the jury made of Belliston's 
other, uncharged drug sales, such determination had no impact upon the "pattern of 
unlawful activity" verdict. Therefore, evidence of the other sales was harmless. 
C. Severance Question Waived by Default. 
Citing State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), Belliston asserts that 
admission of "other acts" evidence required severance of the "pattern of unlawful 
activity" charge supported by that evidence (Br. of Appellant at 9). Actually, Saunders 
defeats this claim, because in Saunders, the Utah Supreme Court observed that a 
severance motion must be made at least five days before trial; if not, severance is 
waived. 699 P.2d at 739-40 (citing former Utah R. Crim. P. 9, now Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-8a-l (1995)). In this case, Belliston did not move to sever the "pattern" charge. 
To the contrary, the record reflects no opposition to the State's motion to consolidate 
the "pattern" charge with the three distribution charges (R. 100:7-8, 17-18). See also 
R. 99:21 (Stacy Belliston case; counsel apparently agreeing to consolidation). 
Accordingly, the severance question is waived. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1198 
(Utah 1984); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). 
D. Cautionary Instruction Waived by Default. 
Belliston's contention that the trial court should have "followfed] defense 
counsels' request for a cautionary instruction" about the "other crimes" evidence (Br. 
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of Appellant at 10), based upon State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), also fails 
due to waiver. On appeal, Belliston does not identify any place in the record showing 
that defense counsel ever made such a request. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Nor 
can the State locate any point at which such a request was made.3 Accordingly, this 
issue also is not properly before this Court. 
Lack of a cautionary instruction was also harmless, if error at all, for the 
same reason that admission of the "other acts" evidence was harmless: the jury found 
Belliston guilty of three charged predicate crimes supporting the "pattern of unlawful 
activity" charge. Even if the jury somehow misinterpreted the significance of the 
uncharged marijuana sales, it had powerful, properly admitted support for the "pattern" 
verdict. A cautionary instruction about the uncharged crimes would not have affected 
that verdict. In sum, none of Belliston's complaints about the admission of "other acts" 
evidence warrants appellate relief from any of his convictions. 
POINT TWO 
BELLISTON WAS NOT ENTRAPPED 
Belliston next contends that he was entrapped into committing the charged 
offenses. The trial jury rejected the entrapment defense (R. 99:95, 104-06). In effect, 
then, Belliston's entrapment claim on appeal is a challenge to the guilty verdicts. See, 
3In Smith, the cautionary instruction was requested in the trial court. 700 P.2d at 1110 
(trial court "should have granted counsel's request for a cautionary instruction, which request 
was made at the time the court ruled the [other acts] evidence admissible"). 
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e.g., State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 
702, 706 (Utah App. 1993). Accordingly, this Court will review the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdicts, Martinez, 848 P.2d at 
706, and will "affirm the defendant's conviction[s] unless the evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped." Id. (citing authority). 
A. No Entrapment. 
Entrapment is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1995), which 
states in pertinent part: 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person 
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
The touchstone is whether "an ordinary person in defendant's situation would be 
induced to commit crime." State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993). 
Applying this standard, the Utah courts have found entrapment where an 
undercover officer or informant badgered the defendant, or appealed to the defendant's 
pity or sympathy. See State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1987) (agent 
posed as attractive single mother on hard times); State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404, 405 
(Utah 1984) (agent prodded defendant whom he had no reason to believe was involved 
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with drugs); State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980) (repetitive drug re-
quests by agent); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503-04 (Utah 1979) (defendant's 
former lover played on his sympathy during her apparent withdrawal from heroin). 
Conversely, Utah courts consistently refuse to find entrapment absent 
"personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability/ State v. 
Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1986). See Moore, 782 P.2d at 501 ("no pleas of 
desperation or appeals based primarily on sympathy or close friendship"); State v. 
Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986) (defendant had previously sold drugs to agent, 
and refused only when he had none to sell); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah 
App. 1989) (agent "did not resort to pity, sympathy, or money"); State v. Wynia, 754 
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah App.) (no badgering, pleas, or high pressure tactics; "[a]ll the 
officers had to do was ask" for drugs), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State 
v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987) (family relationship not exploited; "no -
pleas of desperation or appeals to friendship or loyalty"). 
In this case, the evidence placed the Hooks' undercover activity in the 
latter category, and easily overcame the Bellistons' entrapment defense. "[Mjerely 
providing the opportunity for a drug purchase" falls short of entrapment. State v. 
J.D.W., 910 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
The Hooks did not even know the Bellistons until Raymond Erickson, who knew 
nothing of the drug investigation, introduced them (Tr. 76, 81), so no "friendship" 
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inducement was possible. The Hooks simply accepted Stacy Belliston's offer to sell 
marijuana to them~an offer made not because of any pressure from the Hooks, but 
simply because Stacy was short of drug "buy" money (Tr. 78, 168). 
For his part, Mark Belliston actively participated in the marijuana sales to 
the Hooks. He was present during the first delivery, and witnessed it (Tr. 171-73). 
When consummation of the second Hook sale was delayed, Mark made a point of 
apologizing and assuring the Hooks that in the future, there would be no delays (Tr. 
180, 188, 261). And Mark Belliston himself apparently initiated the third Hook sale, 
appearing at their residence with marijuana to sell (Tr. 189-93). 
State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah App. 1993), provides a useful factual 
comparison. In Keitz, an undercover officer posing as a cocktail waitress "made 
herself known as a drug user." She developed a particular friendship with the 
defendant, massaging him in the tavern where she worked, feigning drug use with him, 
and riding with him on his motorcycle (during one motorcycle ride she allegedly bared 
her breasts at the defendant's urging). She said that she was interested in drugs. 
Eventually, she agreed to sell a pound of marijuana to the defendant, who was 
prosecuted for that transaction. 856 P.2d at 686-87. This Court upheld the trial court's 
rejection of the defendant's entrapment claim. Id. at 690. The undercover operative in 
Keitz engaged in more questionable conduct than did the Hooks in this case. Because 
this Court rejected the entrapment claim in Keitz, it should also reject it in this case. 
2 1 
B. No "Offense Enhancement by Entrapment" 
Mark Belliston raises a variant of entrapment, not alleged by his sister, 
under this point. He argues that he was entrapped into die offense level enhancement 
for selling drugs within 1000 feet of a church, because the Hooks located their trailer, 
where some transactions took place, within that distance of a church (Br. of Appellant 
at 11). Testimony at trial, however, demonstrated that such location of the Hooks' 
trailer was fortuitous, not by police design (Tr. 125, 135). 
Further, Belliston's claim of "offense enhancement by entrapment," 
apparently a question of first impression in Utah, is unsupported in his brief by citation 
to authority or by meaningful analysis; therefore, this Court should reject it. State v. 
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). Also, authority from other jurisdictions 
runs counter to his claim. Federal courts generally reject claims of "sentence 
entrapment," that is, the theory that undercover operatives create conditions for 
criminal behavior that result in a higher sentence than might otherwise result. Where 
recognized, the claim succeeds only if the undercover conduct is "outrageous" in 
violation of due process. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 818 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (sentence entrapment is a "defunct doctrine"); United States v. Messino, 55 
F.3d 1241, 1256 (7th Cir. 1995) (only outrageous police conduct warrants relief); 
United States v. Knecht, 55 F.3d 54, 57 (2nd Cir. 1995) (same). The few state courts 
to have considered this issue follow suit. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, All Mass. 
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686, 659 N.E.2d 741,744-45 (1996); Commonwealth v. Nelson, Pa. Super. , 
666 A.2d 714, 719-21 (1995). 
No due process claim appears viable on the facts of this case. As already 
explained, the police conduct in question falls far short of "outrageous;" instead, it is 
well within the limits set by Utah's appellate courts. Thus all facets of Belliston's 
entrapment claim lack merit. 
POINT THREE 
BELLISTON WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED BOTH OF ENGAGING 
IN A PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES AND OF THE 
PREDICATE OFFENSES 
Belliston next argues that he cannot be convicted both of engaging in a 
pattern of unlawful activities and of the three charged predicate crimes, because the 
latter are lesser included offenses of the "pattern" violation (Br. of Appellant at 12). 
Stacy Belliston also makes this argument. 
A. This Claim is Inadequately Briefed. 
Belliston's one-paragraph argument on this point contains no citation to 
authority; such argument as he makes is vague and disjointed. Therefore, this Court 
should decline to consider it on appeal. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992). 
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B. This Claim Lacks Merit, 
On the merits, Belliston's claim also fails. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) 
(1995) codifies the "lesser included offense" rule, which is rooted in double jeopardy 
principles. The statute provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; 
No Utah court has considered the precise issue Belliston raises. 
However, the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act was modeled after the federal 
"RICO" statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (1970) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act). State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 101 n.l (Utah 1988). Therefore, 
federal authority is persuasive. Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 
965 n.5 (Utah 1986); State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah App. 1994). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered the 
RICO "lesser included offense" question in United States v. Hampton, 786 F.2d 977 
(10th Cir. 1986). Hampton claimed that his sentences under RICO and on Hobbs Act 
racketeering charges, which served as the predicate offenses for RICO, amounted to 
double jeopardy. Id. at 979. The court recognized that the cumulative convictions 
satisfied the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), for a "greater-
lesser" offense relationship: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or 
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transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Hampton, 786 F.2d at 
979 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). "This test is essentially the same as that 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)." State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993). 
However, Blockburger "is not a constitutional 'litmus test' but rather a 
tool of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to allow two 
statutory offenses to be punished cumulatively." Hampton, 786 F.2d at 979 (citing 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980)). "An examination of the statutory 
framework and legislative history of RICO demonstrates that Congress did clearly 
articulate an intent to permit cumulative punishment for substantive RICO violations 
and the underlying predicate acts." Hampton, 786 F.2d at 980. Hence, the court held, 
the district court "properly imposed consecutive sentences" upon Hampton. Id. 
The other federal circuits appear uniformly in accord with Hampton. See, 
e.g., United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Ryland, 806 F.2d 941, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987); 
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
1054, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1535-38 (11th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 860 (1991); United States v. Persico, 11A F.2d 30, 32 (2d 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Black, 759 F.2d 71, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. 
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Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1980). In addition, at least one state, Indiana, 
has found no double jeopardy under similar state statutes. See State v. Allen, 646 
N.E.2d 965 (Ind. App. 1995); Dellenbach v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (Ind. App. 
1987). In a similar legal context, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
prosecution for a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), using a prior conviction as a 
predicate offense, does not constitute double jeopardy. See Garrett v. United States, 
All U.S. 773, 786 (1985). The Court noted that in a single-act crime, the defendant 
"simultaneously commit[s] both the lesser included misdemeanor and the greater 
felony, but the same simply is not true of [the CCE defendant]." Id. at 789.4 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court considered an analogous issue in State v. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). McCovey argued that section 76-l-402(3)(a) 
prohibited his sentences for both felony murder and the predicate offense of aggravated 
robbery. The court acknowledged that aggravated robbery had the "same or less than 
air of the elements of felony murder based on aggravated robbery. Id. at 1237. It 
also conceded that "all elements of aggravated robbery were proven at triar in the 
course of proving the felony murder. Id. Nevertheless, the court held that tt[t]he 
determination to be made is whether the legislature intended aggravated robbery—or 
4The federal Supreme Court recently held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both 
conspiracy and "continuing criminal enterprise" in connection with illegal drug dealing. 
However, consistent with Garrett, the Court did not hold that it is improper to convict a 
defendant of one of these offenses plus any number of predicate crimes~the situation presented 
in this case. See Rutledge v. United States, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996). 
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any of the felonies listed in subsection [76-5-203](l)(d)—to be a lesser included offense 
of second degree felony murder." Id. at 1238. The court concluded that the legislature 
did not intend aggravated robbery to merge into felony murder; hence, punishing 
McCovey "for both felony murder and the underlying felony violates neither the double 
jeopardy principles of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1978)." 
So too in this case, the Utah Legislature clearly intended to permit 
cumulative punishment for both "pattern of unlawful activity" and the underlying 
predicate crimes. The "pattern" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4) (1995), 
makes any listed crime a predicate offense "regardless of whether the act is in fact 
charged or indicted by any authority." Id. Therefore, a charged predicate offense can 
support the "pattern" conviction. In view of this express statement of intent, plus the 
accumulated weight of other authority, Belliston's "lesser included offense" claim fails 
on its merits, as well as for lack of adequate appellate briefing. 
POINT FOUR 
BELLISTON IS NOT ENTITLED TO DELETION OF THE "CHURCH 
PROXIMITY" FINDING FOR SENTENCING PURPOSES 
Belliston next argues that the trial court erred in not reducing his second 
degree felony conviction for distributing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a 
church to a third degree felony conviction for sentencing purposes (Br. of Appellant at 
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13-14). He argues that the "church proximity" should have been deleted to achieve this 
result; however, he admits that the marijuana transactions at the Hooks' residence 
occurred within 1000 feet of a church (Br. of Appellant at 13). In her brief on appeal 
Stacy Belliston also urges deletion of the "church proximity" factor. 
A. This Claim is Inadequately Briefed. 
Belliston does not adequately support this claim. Again, his brief lacks 
citation to authority. That deficiency is especially problematic given that Belliston 
concedes the existence of the factual predicate for the "church proximity" finding. He 
cites no authority to support his apparent argument that the "church proximity" factor 
requires that there be "people attending church" in order to apply (Br. of Appellant at 
13). Again, therefore, this Court should not consider Belliston's argument on appeal. 
B. This Claim Lacks Merit. 
This claim also fails on its merits. Trial court sentencing decisions are 
given broad appellate deference. " A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless 
the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or 
imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 457 (Utah App. 1993). "[T]he appellate court can properly find abuse only if it 
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
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Properly framed, Belliston's argument would be under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-402(1) (1995), which allows a court, if it "concludes it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute," and 
"unless otherwise specifically provided by law," to "enter a judgment of conviction for 
the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly." By its terms, this 
statute is wholly discretionary: the court "may" enter a conviction for a lower degree. 
Abuse of discretion is not even remotely possible on the record in this 
case. Belliston and his sister, Stacy, engaged in numerous illicit drug transactions that 
were the subject of the cases under review. They were deeply and regularly engaged in 
marijuana sales: Raymond Erickson described Stacy as "the person who supplies 
marijuana for the town" of Beaver (Tr. 230). Mark Belliston was fully involved in that 
business. For the charges of which he was found guilty, Mark Belliston could have 
been imprisoned for up to forty years, if sentenced consecutively. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-3-203, 76-3-401(1) (1995). Instead (and perhaps surprisingly) he received 
suspended concurrent sentences and probation. Clearly, there was no abuse of 
discretion in that sentencing decision. 
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POINT FIVE 
TO WHATEVER DEGREE IT DEPARTED FROM THE 
PRESENTENCE RECOMMENDATION, THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING BELLISTON 
In his final point on appeal, Belliston argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by allegedly not following the recommendation made by the Adult Probation 
and Parole department, upon his sixty-day presentence evaluation (Br. of Appellant at 
14; R. 100:60-61). He does not specify which recommendation, if any, was not 
followed, so this claim also can be rejected for want of adequate briefing. 
Examination of the presentence report is not necessary to resolve 
Belliston's final argument, for that argument is frivolous. As already recited, Belliston 
received a suspended sentence, and probation, even though the trial court could have 
imposed prison sentences totalling forty years. To whatever degree the presentence 
report recommended even more lenient treatment, such recommendation was only a 
recommendation—it did not bind the sentencing court. See State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 
862, 864-65 (Utah 1979) (trial court did not abuse discretion when it denied A.P. & P. 
recommendation for additional evaluation time, and imposed sentence). In sum, 
Belliston's sentences, which were well within the statutory limits prescribed for his 
crimes, cannot possibly be viewed as an abuse of trial court discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mark Belliston's convictions and sentences 
should be AFFIRMED. The issues in this case are sufficiently clear that oral argument 
would not materially assist the Court. If the merits of Belliston's "lesser included 
offense" argument (Point Three of this brief) are reached, a published opinion would 
provide useful guidance to bench and bar. 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor 
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the 
issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was 
entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days 
before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss 
the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. Any order by the 
court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is an 
issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial where 
the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies and any 
testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach 
his testimony at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the defendant, 
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of 
offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically provided by law 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601. Short title. 
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, 
corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as 
licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which constitutes 
the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or 
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. 
Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be 
related either to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes comprising 
a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 31, 1981. The most recent 
act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shall have 
occurred within five years of the commission of the next preceding act alleged as part 
of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or 
beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and local governmental entities. 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to solicit, request, 
command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to engage in conduct which 
would constitute any offense described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, 
or to attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of those 
offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority or 
is classified as a misdemeanor or a felony: 
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Title 58, Chapter 
37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance 
Precursor Act; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(3). 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
